For those working in the UAS and C-UAS fields, we are overdue for the establishment of a U.S. Drone Policy Coordinator, an entity proposed to be an empowered office responsible for unifying unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and counter-UAS (C-UAS) policy across government and industry. The position would serve as the central coordinating authority for the Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and the White House policy apparatus, ensuring that U.S. efforts in UAS production, integration, and protection advance cohesively.

Recent policy actions demonstrate both momentum and fragmentation. Reference (a) directed accelerated UAS testing, BVLOS rulemaking, and expansion of domestic production. Reference (b) signaled a major shift in DoD posture, prioritizing drone dominance through procurement and training. References (c) through (e) highlight the FAA's ongoing work to establish corridors, collect operational data, and finalize BVLOS regulations. Reference (d), the June 2025 DOT OIG report, underscored gaps in BVLOS progress, while reference (e), the FAA's Part 108 NPRM, depends on operational evidence that industry cannot yet generate at scale. At the state level, programs such as NUAIR's corridor expansion in New York and the Vantis statewide network in North Dakota, references (g) and (h), prove the feasibility of repeatable BVLOS operations anchored outside DoD ranges. These initiatives remain disconnected in governance and execution.

A Drone Policy Coordinator would unify these efforts. On the civil side, the Coordinator would direct the establishment of permanent FAA Certificates of Authorization and civil UAS corridors across the nation, anchored in FAA Test Sites and supported by Section 925 funding. These corridors would become the proving ground for both ISR platforms and C-UAS systems developed by U.S. industry. On the defense and homeland security side, the Coordinator would lead development of a coherent national C-UAS framework under the emerging "mini-golden dome" concept. This concept envisions a layered shield of detection, identification, and non-kinetic defeat around sensitive facilities, ports, borders, and public events, with interoperability across agencies and industry.

Central to this effort is the structured inclusion of civilian companies. Many firms are innovating in ISR and C-UAS platforms, but they lack predictable avenues for government engagement or sustainment funding. The Coordinator would create a transparent pipeline where industry can submit products for evaluation, where test corridors provide validated operational data, and where successful systems are transitioned into funded acquisition programs. This addresses a recurring industry concern: too many demonstrations without pathways to procurement. Ensuring that firms are compensated for viable products is as critical as accelerating policy, because without commercial viability the industrial base will erode even as policy advances.

A further responsibility of the Coordinator would be to address the national shortage of dedicated UAS and C-UAS testing infrastructure. At present, domestic testing is fragmented, with most opportunities confined to small private ranges ran or owned by companies manufacturing and developing UAS, or expensive specialized facilities such as Nine Mile, which imposes high costs even on government partners. This lack of accessible testing environments slows evaluation, forces companies into isolated demonstrations, and inhibits the collection of standardized performance data. The Coordinator would oversee the establishment of a network of federally recognized testing sites, co-located with FAA Test Sites where feasible, and dedicated to both UAS integration and C-UAS evaluation. Section 925 of the FAA Reauthorization Act provides matching funds for demonstrations, which the Coordinator would leverage to reduce cost barriers and expand access.

Current FAA regulations, particularly 14 C.F.R. Part 107, explicitly prohibit hazardous operations such as intentionally colliding one aircraft with another. These restrictions extend to drone-on-drone testing, making it effectively illegal for companies to conduct realistic aerial interception trials in U.S. airspace. As a result, development of kinetic interceptors and close-in C-UAS concepts is stunted domestically. Policy must be advanced to authorize designated federal ranges where such testing is legally permitted, safely contained, and properly instrumented. The Drone Policy Coordinator would be tasked with crafting that regulatory framework in coordination with the FAA, ensuring that industry can develop and demonstrate both kinetic and non-kinetic C-UAS systems without regulatory uncertainty.

The Department of Defense remains behind in implementing both UAS and C-UAS solutions. While battlefield demand has accelerated development, institutional adoption has lagged, and the Department has too often relied on industry pushes for single-solution approaches. A particular imbalance exists around electronic warfare: industry has positioned EW as the default C-UAS answer, but adversary evolution in autonomy and hardened navigation means EW alone cannot defeat all threats. Conversely, kinetic solutions, whether manned intercepts, fixed-wing rammers, or small arms, all carry unacceptable risks in domestic settings, where debris and rounds falling from the sky create new hazards. A balanced national approach is required, combining electronic warfare, directed-energy options, protocol-aware RF control, and carefully regulated kinetic interceptors within the "mini-golden dome" construct. The Coordinator would unify that balance, ensuring that DoD, DHS, FAA, and industry field layered solutions that are both effective and safe for the environment in which they are used.

To achieve these outcomes, the office must be positioned with sufficient authority to align civil, defense, and homeland equities. The recommended model is a White House-level Coordinator, dual-hatted through the National Security Council and the Office of Science and Technology Policy. This placement ensures top-down policy authority while drawing execution capability through secondment of personnel and resources from the Department of Defense for acquisition and counter-UAS, and from the Federal Aviation Administration for integration. The Coordinator would chair a National UAS Council composed of FAA, DoD, DHS, DOJ, Commerce, and FCC representatives, providing a unified forum to align strategy, resolve interagency disputes, and accelerate both UAS integration and counter-UAS deployment.

Establishing a unified and empowered Drone Policy Coordinator will provide industry with clarity and direction, allies with confidence in U.S. leadership, and the federal government with a central authority capable of synchronizing policy with production. The office should be created by Executive Order to ensure interagency authority; once created, the Coordinator should publish a National Drone Strategy within six months, and deliver an annual posture review measuring integration and protection progress. Without this office, U.S. drone policy will remain fragmented, domestic production will outpace integration, and adversaries will continue to exploit seams in our defenses.

References:

(a) Executive Order, Unleashing American Drone Dominance, The White House, 6 June 2025.

(b) Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Unleashing U.S. Military Drone Dominance, 10 July 2025.

(c) FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024, Public Law 118-63, Section 925.

(d) Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General Report, FAA Efforts to Advance Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) Operations, June 2025.

(e) FAA Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Part 108: BVLOS Operations of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, August 2025.

(f) 14 C.F.R. Part 107, Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, specifically §107.23 (hazardous operations) and §107.31 (visual line of sight), prohibiting intentional collisions or interference with other aircraft.

(g) NUAIR UAS Corridor Expansion Reports, Rome, NY, 2025. (h) Vantis Statewide BVLOS Network, North Dakota Test Site, 2025.